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Abstract
Based on a pioneering work by Ippolito (1980) we construct a sim-
ple model which allows the welfare e⁄ects of third-degree price discrim-
ination to be well understood and explained. The decomposition of the
change in welfare into a misallocation e⁄ect and an output e⁄ect has
advantages over the well-established analysis by Schmalensee (1981)
and Varian (1985). In particular, our approach provides a graphic
analysis which clari￿es the welfare analysis of third-degree price dis-
crimination. (JEL D42, L12, L13)
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1I. INTRODUCTION
Price discrimination under imperfect competition is an important area of
economic research,1 and third-degree price discrimination, the most preva-
lent form of price discrimination, is a major item in any standard treatment
of monopoly theory covered in intermediate and advanced microeconomics
courses (see, for instance, Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2008, or Varian, 1992,
2006). Under third-degree price discrimination the seller can charge di⁄er-
ent prices to consumers belonging to di⁄erent groups or submarkets. For
example, the seller may charge di⁄erent prices to customers who are sepa-
rated geogra￿cally (the home and the export markets) or that are di⁄erenti-
ated by age (senior citizen￿ s discounts), occupation (student discounts), time
of purchases (initial equipment and replacement purchases), or by enduse
(milk for liquid consumption or for further processing). Moving from non-
discrimination to discrimination raises the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts, harms consumers in
markets where the prices increase and bene￿ts the consumers who face lower
prices. Consequently, the overall e⁄ect on welfare is undetermined.
Understanding the conditions under which the change in social welfare
can be signed has concerned economists at least from the earlier work by
Pigou (1920) and Robinson (1933). A move from uniform pricing to third-
degree price discrimination generates, as will be shown below, two e⁄ects:2
￿rst, price discrimination causes a misallocation of goods from high to low
value users (that is, output is not e¢ ciently distributed to the highest-value
end); second, price discrimination a⁄ects total output. Therefore, since price
discrimination is viewed as an ine¢ cient way of distributing a given quantity
of output between di⁄erent consumers or submarkets, a necessary condition
for price discrimination to increase social welfare is that it should increase
total output.3 In consequence, in order for price discrimination to increase
welfare a positive output e⁄ect must o⁄set the negative e⁄ect of distributional
ine¢ ciency.
Schmalensee (1981)￿ s direct approach to the welfare e⁄ect and Varian￿ s
celebrated bounds on social welfare (1985, 1989,1992) have dominated both
1See Stole (2007), Armstrong (2008) and Liu and Serfes (2010) for excellent theoretical
surveys. See also McAfee (2008) for a modern view of price discrimination and for antitrust
implications.
2McAfee (2008) provides a nice explanation of these e⁄ects.
3See, for example, Robinson (1933), Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1985), Schwartz
(1990) and more recently Bertoletti (2004). However, when marginal costs varies across
markets that result does not maintain (see, Bertoletti, 2009).
2the research and the teaching of the welfare e⁄ects of third-degree price
discrimination for the last twenty-￿ve years. Our analysis, inspired by the
pioneering work by Ippolito (1980) and its generalization to n markets by
Aguirre (2008), o⁄ers some advantages over Schmalensee￿ s and Varian￿ s.
Firstly, it focuses directly on the change in welfare (instead of on indirect
Lagrangian techniques or on exogenous bounds) and allows the output e⁄ect
(that is, the social valuation of the change in total output) to be distinguished
neatly from the misallocation e⁄ect. In addition we show how it is possible
to prove the theorem that "a necessary condition for third-degree price dis-
crimination to increase social welfare is that total output increases" by using
this decomposition. Our approach to the welfare e⁄ects of discrimination is
also more intuitive and can be illustrated graphically.
II. ANALYSIS
Consider a monopolist selling a good in two perfectly separated markets.
The demand function in market i (i = 1;2) is given by Di(pi), where pi is
the price charged in that market and the inverse demand function is pi(qi),
where qi is the quantity sold. Unit cost, c, is assumed to be constant. The
price elasticity in market i is given by "i(pi) = ￿[D
0
i(pi)pi]=Di(pi). The pro￿t





Under simple monopoly pricing, pro￿ts are maximized by charging all











0) = 0: (1)
Therefore, under uniform pricing, the optimal policy is given by (p0￿c)=p0 =
1="(p0), where p0 denotes the uniform price and "(p0) is the elasticity of the
aggregate demand at p0. If we let D(p) =
P2
i=1 Di(p) denote the aggregate
demand, then this elasticity is simply the weighted average elasticity: "(p0) = P2
i=1 ￿i(p0)"i(p0), where the elasticity of market i is weighted by the "share"




i denote the quantity sold in market i, q0
i = Di(p0) (i = 1;2), and q0
3denote the total output, q0 =
P2
i=1 Di(p0), under uniform pricing which can

























































The monopolist is willing to increase (decrease) the price in market i if the
elasticity in that market, "i(p0), is lower (higher) than the elasticity of the
aggregate demand, "(p0).































where i;j = 1;2;j 6= i: Note that ￿
0
i(p0) > 0 i⁄"j(p0) > "i(p0); i;j = 1;2;j 6=
i. Therefore, if possible the monopolist would want to increase the price in
the market with lower elasticity of demand and to reduce the price in the
market with higher elasticity of demand.










i) = 0; i = 1;2; (6)
4where pd
i denotes the optimal price in market i (and pro￿t functions are as-
sumed to be strictly concave in the relevant range). Under price discrimina-




i); i = 1;2, where pd







i) is the price-elasticity in market i. That is,
the Lerner index in each market is inversely proportional to its elasticity
of demand and the monopolist therefore sets a higher price in the mar-
ket with the lower elasticity of demand. The quantity sold in market i
is qd
i = Di(pd









i). Given the ￿rst order conditions in (6), total out-

















The change in the quantity sold in market i is given by ￿qi = qd
i ￿ q0
i,
i = 1;2. We assume with no loss of generality that market 1 is the market
with the lower elasticity of demand (the strong market) and market 2 the
market with the higher elasticity (the weak market) . We have implicitly
assumed that both markets are served under both price regimes so, given the
strict concavity of the pro￿t functions, then pd
1 > p0 > pd
2.4 Therefore, price
discrimination decreases the output in market 1 and increases output in mar-
ket 2: ￿q1 < 0 and ￿q2 > 0. The e⁄ect of third-degree price discrimination
on social welfare depends crucially on the change in the total output given
by ￿q = qd ￿ q0 = ￿q1 + ￿q2. We next show that the demand curvature
plays a relevant role in determining the e⁄ect on total output.
The Change in Total Output and Demand Curvature





















4See in Nahata et al. (1990) the analysis when pro￿t functions are not strictly concave.

























































From (10) we obtain that the e⁄ect of third-degree price discrimination on to-
tal output depends on the demand curvature in each market.5 If the demand
in the lower elasticity market is strictly concave (strictly convex) and the
demand in the higher elasticity market is strictly convex (strictly concave)
then total output increases (decreases) with price discrimination. When all
demands are linear output remains unchanged.
Welfare E⁄ects












[p2(q) ￿ c]dq, (11)
that is, the change in welfare is the sum across markets of the cumulative dif-
ference between price and marginal cost for each market between the output
5See, for example, Robinson (1933), Schmalensee (1981), Shih, Mai and Liu (1988),
Cheung and Wang (1994), Cowan (2007) and Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010).
6under single pricing and the output under price discrimination.6 As output
decreases in the market with lower elasticity of demand and increases in the
market with higher elasticity of demand, the ￿rst term in (11) is the welfare
loss in market 1, whereas the second term is the welfare gain in market 2.7
Figure 1 illustrates how the welfare e⁄ect of third-degree price discrimina-
tion is measured as the addition of the (negative) change in total surplus in
market 1 and the (positive) change in total surplus in market 2.8
6We consider the case of quasilinear-utility function with an aggregate utility function
of the form
P2
i=1[ui(qi)+yi], where qi is consumption in submarket i and yi is the amount
to be spent on other consumption goods, i = 1;2. It is assumed that u
0




7The overall e⁄ect on welfare may be positive or negative. See Aguirre, Cowan and
Vickers (2010) for su¢ cient conditions based on the shape of the demand and inverse
demand functions to determine the sign of the welfare e⁄ect.
8Ippolito (1980) and more recently Cowan (2011) analyze the e⁄ect of third-degree
price discrimination on consumer surplus and ￿nd reasonable settings where the e⁄ect is
positive. In a related paper Leeson and Sobel (2008) consider costly price discrimination.
Note that if consumer surplus increases then social welfare would increase even though
price discrimination costs o⁄set the private incentive to price discriminate.
7We want to break down the e⁄ect on social welfare into two e⁄ects: a
misallocation e⁄ect, which can be interpreted as the welfare loss due to the
transfer of q units of production from market 1 (the market with lower elas-
ticity) to the market 2 (the market with higher elasticity), and an output
e⁄ect, which can be interpreted as the e⁄ect of the change in total output on
social welfare. Obviously, the e⁄ect of total output on social welfare crucially
depends on whether third-degree price discrimination increases total output
or not. Then we decompose the change in welfare into the two e⁄ects for the
case where price discrimination increases total output.9
We assume that ￿q ￿ 0 and since the change in total output is given by
9The Appendix considers the case where price discrimination reduces total output.
8￿q = ￿q1 + ￿q2, the change in output in market 2 is ￿q2 = ￿q ￿ ￿q1 =

















[p2(q) ￿ c]dq; (12)
Given that qd
i = q0

















[p2(q) ￿ c]dq; (13)
which under quasilinear utility pi(qi) = u
0


































2) and by adding and subtracting (p0￿c)￿q1, see Figure 2, we can express
the change in welfare as:
￿W = ME + OE, (15)
where the misallocation e⁄ect, ME, and the output e⁄ect, OE, when total







































2 + j￿q1j) ￿ u2(q0
2)] and may therefore be interpreted as the
welfare loss due to the transfer of j￿q1j units of production from market 1
to market 2. The output e⁄ect (17), OE, can be interpreted as the e⁄ect of
additional output on social welfare. It is positive because the social valuation
of the increase in output exceeds the marginal social cost. Figure 3 illustrates
the output e⁄ect (the green area) and the misallocation e⁄ect (the red area).
11Some important lessons can be drawn from the above analysis:
(i) An increase in total output is a necessary (but of course not su¢ cient)
condition for third-degree price discrimination to increase social welfare. This
conclusion is not based on exogenous bounds. Since the misallocation e⁄ect,
(16), is always non-positive then a positive output e⁄ect (based on an in-
crease in output) is needed to increase social welfare. In fact, that argument
represents an earlier, easier and more intuitive demonstration of the theo-
rem that an increase in output is a necessary condition for discrimination
raises social welfare. Under linear demand, given that total output remains
constant, social welfare is reduced by price discrimination.
(ii) Market Opening. In the above analysis we assume that both markets are
served under both price regimes. We now analyze the case in which third-
degree price discrimination serves to open markets; that is, we assume that
market 2 is only served under third-degree price discrimination. Note that in
this case pd
1 = p0 > pd
2 and therefore ￿q1 = 0 and ￿q2 = qd
2 > 0. Therefore,
in this case price discrimination not only increases social welfare but also
implies a Pareto improvement. Notice that the misallocation e⁄ect would
be zero and the output e⁄ect would obviously be positive given that total
output increases.
(iii) The use of linear demands is not appropiate for illustrating the welfare
e⁄ects of third-degree price discrimination. Non-specialized readers might
reach the conclusion that the only way for third-degree price discrimination
to increase welfare is by opening markets. However, the change in welfare
depends on two e⁄ects: a misallocation e⁄ect and an output e⁄ect. It is easy
to construct examples where price discrimination increases social welfare but
both markets are served.
Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010) ￿nd su¢ cient conditions, based on
the curvatures of direct and inverse demand functions for third-degree price
discrimination to increase (or decrease) social welfare. Their main results
are that welfare is higher with discrimination when inverse demand in the
weak market is more convex than that in the strong market and the price
di⁄erence with discrimination is small, and discrimination reduces welfare
when the direct demand function is more convex in the high-price market.
Cowan (2011) shows that aggregate consumer surplus is higher with dis-
crimination if the ratio of pass-through to the price elasticity (at the uniform
price) is the same or larger in the weak market.10 As an application he shows
10Pass-through is extensively analyzed by Weyl and Fabinger (2011) and shown to be a
12that discrimination always increases surplus for logit demand functions whose
pass-through rates exceed 0.5 (so demand is convex). Note that an increase
in the consumer surplus ensures an increase in social welfare given that price
discrimination increases pro￿ts (at least for a monopolist). Therefore, with
this demand family results are just contrary to those under linear demand:
the output e⁄ect always dominates the misallocation e⁄ect for logit demand
functions (with pass-through rates exceeding 0.5).
The constant elasticity demand family is very appropriate for illustrating
the tradeo⁄between the two e⁄ects given that as total output increases with
discrimination (see, Ippolito, 1980, Aguirre, 2006, and Aguirre, Cowan and
Vickers, 2010) output e⁄ect is positive. If both the share of the strong market
under uniform pricing and the di⁄erence between demand elasticities are big
enough then the output e⁄ect dominates to the misallocation e⁄ect (see,
Aguirre, 2011).
(iv) Third-degree price discrimination is a topic covered by any microeco-
nomics text book. However, there is a gap in the literature with respect
to an appropriate graphical analysis of the e⁄ects on social welfare.11 The
above analysis ￿lls this gap and provides a graphic treatment that is acces-
sible for most readers and highlights the welfare e⁄ects of third-degree price
discrimination.
We next compare our analysis with Schmalensee￿ s and Varian￿ s.
(v) Schmalensee (1981) in his graphical analysis decomposed social welfare
into two e⁄ects:12
unifying concept which generalizes and simpli￿es the analysis of many industrial organi-
zation models.
11Graphical presentations of third-degree price discrimination typically focus on the
comparison of the corresponding pro￿t maximization problems. See for example Round
and McIver (2006) and Weber and Pasche (2008) for recent analysis.






































where the third term on the right hand in (18) may be equivalently written
as (p0 ￿c)￿Q. Schmalensee (1981) named the ￿rst two terms the (negative)
distribution e⁄ect and the last term the output e⁄ect. In contrast, in our
paper the output e⁄ect is the social valuation of an increase in output (that
is the valuation of the consumers in the most elastic market). Figure 4 shows
14how in the Schmalensee￿ s approach the distribution e⁄ect and the output
e⁄ect are overstated and overlapped. His ouput e⁄ect (the green area plus
the blue area), (p0 ￿ c)￿Q, exaggerates the social valuation of the increase
in total output. It is more reasonable to de￿ne the output e⁄ect as the
valuation of the additional output by the elastic market consumers (that is,
those consumers enjoying the increase in output); i.e. the green area. On the
other hand, the Schmalensee￿ s distribution e⁄ect overestimates the negative
e⁄ect of distributional ine¢ ciency: the red areas plus the (negative) blue
area. Our approach presents two advantages: ￿rst, it allows to interpret
the misallocation e⁄ect as the welfare loss due to the transfer of j￿q1j units
of production from consumers in market 1 to consumers in market 2 and,
second, it identi￿es the output e⁄ect by stating the social valuation of an
increase in output as the increase in total surplus of consumer in market 2,
the most elastic demand market.
(vi) Varian (1985) obtained upper and lower bounds on the change in welfare
when moving from uniform pricing to third-degree price discrimination. By
using the property of concavity of the utility function the bounds on welfare
change are:
(p
0 ￿ c)￿Q ￿ ￿W ￿ (p
d
1 ￿ c)￿q1 + (p
d
2 ￿ c)￿q2: (19)






































The upper bound provides a necessary condition for price discrimination to
increase social welfare (that is, an increase in output) and the lower bound a
su¢ cient condition. Our approach presents some advantages over Varian￿ s.
One crucial advantage relates to the graphical analysis: his graphic treatment
goes not very further from the one market case as it appears in Varian (1992)￿ s
text book. On the other hand, the bounds are not very informative. Consider
for example the two cases used by Varian (1992) to illustrate the bounds:
(i) linear demands and (ii) market opening. In both cases, our approach
allows to compute exactly the welfare change. (i) Under linear demands (20)
becomes:

















and however our analysis states, from (15), (16) and (17), that:
























On the other hand, when uniform pricing serves to open markets ( pd
1 =
p0 > pd
2, ￿q1 = 0 and ￿q2 = qd

























while the change in social welfare is given by:












Based on a pioneering paper by Ippolito (1980) we construct a simple
model which allows the welfare e⁄ects of third-degree price discrimination to
be well understood and explained. The decomposition of the change in wel-
fare into a misallocation e⁄ect and an output e⁄ect has advantages over the
well-established analyses by Schmalensee (1981) and Varian (1985). In par-
ticular, our approach provides a graphic analysis which clari￿es the welfare
analysis of third-degree price discrimination.
16APPENDIX
Here we decompose the change in welfare into two e⁄ects for cases where
third-degree price discrimination does not increase total output. When total




























































1(q) ￿ c]dq: (27)
By adding and subtracting (p0 ￿c)￿q2 the misallocation and the output































1(q) ￿ c]dq: (29)





2)] and may therefore be interpreted as the welfare
loss due to the transfer of ￿q2 units of production from market 1 to market
2. The output e⁄ect, OE, can be interpreted as the e⁄ect of the reduction
in output on social welfare. It is negative because the social valuation of the
increase in output exceeds the marginal social cost.
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